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In a recent article in this law review, William J. Stuntz argues that 
criminal law in the United States suffers from a political pathology.1 
The incentives of legislators are such that the notorious overcriminali­
zation of American society is deep as well as broad. That is, not only 
are remote corners of life subject to criminal penalties - such things 
as tearing tags off mattresses and overworking animals - but now 
crimes are defined with the express design of easing the way to convic­
tion. Is proof of a tangible harm an obstacle to using wire and mail 
fraud statutes to prosecute political misconduct? Well, then, eliminate 
tangible harm as an element of proof! The cumulative effect of this 
multi-dimensional overcriminalization is not just the enhancement of 
prosecutorial power, but its expansion at the expense of the judiciary. 
With a broad palette of highly specific offenses to work with, the 
prosecutor effectively adjudicates. If proof of a serious offense is 
unavailable, the prosecutor can convict nevertheless through proof of 
several less serious but more conveniently tailored offenses - usually 
by means of. a plea agreement bargained for in the shadow of near­
certain conviction at trial. And this rich palette of offenses also 
enables the prosecutor to exercise legislative power - with the bless­
ings of legislators - as he mixes and matches narrowly drawn offenses 
into a variegated basis of liability. The upshot is a huge concentration 
of power and a serious erosion of the rule of law. 
I think Stuntz has misdiagnosed the problem. My argument is not 
that the trend Stuntz describes is a good one, but that it is either not 
pathological, or pathological for a reason Stuntz ignores.2 
* Visiting Professor, University of Michigan Law School; Professor of Law, Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law. A.B. 1981, Washington University in St. Louis; J.D. 1984, Cornell. 
- Ed. 
1. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 
(2001). 
2. I assume that Stuntz means to use the word "pathological" in its ordinary sense as 
"due to or involving disease," WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN 
ENGLISH 990 (3d college ed. 1994), or as pertaining to pathology, that is to "[a] departure or 
deviation from a normal condition." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000). 
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Power shifts in tripartite constitutional systems; The accretion of 
powers to the President during and after World War Two was the oc­
casion of great alarm for many conservatives, just as the accretion of 
power to the nation's prosecutors is the occasion of alarm for Stuntz. 
The difficulty is that neither law nor the Constitution provides a per­
fect refuge from politics, and in a constitutional democracy this is as it 
should be. Imbalances of power in a constitutional system may be 
dangerous, unwise, or unjust, but at the same time benign - in that 
they are internal, inevitable, cyclical shifts of power. Just as one can 
place a benign construction on the dominance of the modem presi­
dency, it is possible to place a benign construction on prosecutorial 
dominarwe in contemporary criminal law. Overcriminalization may be 
the distorted, misguided, but fundamentally legitimate expression of 
an expectation that the aims of the criminal law will parallel the aims 
of ordinary morality. If so, then overcriminalization is not pathologi­
cal. 
If overcriminalization is pathological, then Stuntz overlooks the 
most likely pathogen: the consequentialist theory of punishment. 
Overcriminalization must be seen in historical context. It has acceler­
ated at about the same time that we have seen an explosion of other 
harsh measures meant to deal decisively with crime: three strikes laws, 
mandatory minimum sentences, rigid determinate sentencing systems, 
sexual offender commitment statutes, and expanded death sentenc­
ing.3 The concurrence and combined effect of these innovations is not 
an accident. Simplistic legal theory has given us simplistic laws. In 
spite of the retributive rhetoric that surrounds them, these laws are all 
premised on a crude act consequentialism: they aim to promote social 
welfare by the ad hoc incapacitation of anyone who seems likely to 
diminish it. Scholars of the criminal law used to worry that a conse­
querttialist approach to punishment would reduce the criminal law to a 
system of quarantine, in which concern for individual desert and pro­
portionality in punishment would be abjured in favor of the welfare­
enhancing segregation of undesirables from the general population. 
N.ow we have such a criminal law, and prominent scholars embrace, 
embellish� and defend it.4 
To attribute these large trends in the criminal law to a theory of 
punishment probably sounds implausible. It suggests that thoughtful 
legislators around the country have misread their Hart and neglected 
3. See generally Joseph E. Kennedy, Monstrous Offenders and the Search for Solidarity 
Through Modern Punishment, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 829 (2000) (describing and analyzing these 
innovations). 
4. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence-Enhancements in a 
World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE LJ. 1097 (2001) (decrying the possible effect of the 
Apprendi decision on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines); see also Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that any fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases pun­
ishment beyond a statutory maximum must be proved to a jury). 
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their Fletcher. This kind of parody is almost ·unavoidable when one 
tries to bring theory to bear on doctrine.· and policy, but it is, 
nevertheless, not my argument. Any practical enterprise is backed by 
a working theory, by some basic assumptions - in the case of punish­
ment, by assumptions about value, motivation, and right conduct.· In 
much of American law and legal scholarship for the last half-century, 
these assumptions have been mistaken. ·Scholars, legislators, and 
judges have been working with a theory of action according to which 
value and motivation are arbitrarily "subjective," so that our only 
guide to right conduct is the analysis . of preferences revealed in the 
market or the voting booth. This theory, best described as pseudo­
Humean,5 has given us the decidedly mixed. ·blessings of legal eco­
nomics and public choice theory, as well as. -the act consequentialism 
that lies behind the quarantine approach to· criminal justice. This 
theory - this set of pervasive assumptions - is the pathogen at work 
in the overcriminalization that worries Stuntz. 
II. PATHOLOGICAL ORNOT · . 
Stuntz sees, and enables us to see, how overly specific criminal 
statutes present just as much danger to the rule of law as vague, over­
broad statutes. This is an important insight, particularly when pre­
sented in the historical and political context. that Stuntz gives it. But 
we might have expected this to be the case: both vagueness and speci­
ficity threaten the rule of law when. taken to extremes because the 
principle of legality encompasses many potentially conflic;ting, 
less-than-absolute requirements on �he criminal law. Some of these 
conflicts are internal to the rule of law ideal, such as the requirement 
of generality in criminal prohibitions: it is entailed J:>y the bans on ex 
post facto and judicial lawmaking (given that �x ant� legislative prohi­
bitions can only be stated in general terms) but it necessarily increases 
vagueness and detracts from notice. Some cQg,flicts, on the other hand, 
are external: they arise because certain ends of punishment run coun­
ter to legality itself. For example, any sophisticated consequentialist 
theory of punishment recognizes the utility in mollifying public anger 
and resentment over crime.6 But this mollifying. function inevitably 
5. See HENRY RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 14 (1997) 
("The core of the pseudo-Humean position is the claim that while reason is concerned with 
ascertaining the truth of statements or beliefs, desires are not such as to be true or false."); 
Kyron Huigens, The Dead End of Deterrence, and Beyond, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 
999-1000 & n.241 (2000) [hereinafter Huigens, Dead End] (contrasting this view, which is 
characteristic of legal economics, with more sophisticated neo-Humean theories of action); 
see also Kyron Huigens, Law, Economics, and the Skeleton of Value Fallacy, 89 CAL. L. 
REV. 537 (2001) (book review) [hereinafter Huigens, Law, Economics] (criticizing legal 
economists' conception of value and motivation). · · 
6. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 
591, 593 (1996) ("Punishment is not just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special social 
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collides with rule of law constraints: prompt lynchings satisfy the mob, 
but not the rule of law. The prosecutor emerges as a necessary player 
in the system - one whose job it is to find the right balance between 
legality and the ends of the criminal law that run counter to legality, as 
well as between legality's internally conflicting dictates. Stuntz makes 
a persuasive case that prosecutors have used their political influence 
to find the wrong balance. 
Stuntz's argument that this imbalance is pathological, however, is 
unpersuasive. Internal conflicts in the rule of law ideal are not patho­
logical. However difficult it might be to find the proper balance be­
tween the constituents of legality, such conflicts are a matter of the 
legal system's ordinary functioning. If there is a pathogen at work in 
overcriminalization, then one would expect to find it in the counter­
vailing ends of punishment that create external conflicts with the rule 
of law ideal. Stuntz's argument suggests such a diagnosis: that over­
criminalization represents an oversupply of goods such as the mollifi­
cation of public anger and resentment; and that the skewed incentives 
that produce this oversupply result from an overvaluation of such 
goods by political actors, if not by the public at large.7 But if this is the 
pathology Stuntz has in mind, then he has not considered carefully 
enough the nature of the legitimate ends of punishment that run coun­
ter to the rule of law, and the role they play in the politics he de­
scribes. 
Let me suggest a similar but benign diagnosis. Overcriminalization 
may be the product of an expectation on the part of many citizens that 
the criminal law will provide not only social control, but also proper 
condemnation of wrongdoing. This expectation is problematic from a 
rule of law perspective because the requisite condemnation is not just 
legal but moral condemnation. Because ordinary morality is compre-
convention that signifies moral condemnation."); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The 
Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 457 (1997) ("[T]he criminal law's moral credibility 
is essential to effective crime control, and is enhanced if the distribution of criminal liability 
is perceived as 'doing justice,' that is, if it assigns liability and punishment in ways that the 
community perceives as consistent with the community's principles of appropriate liability 
and punishment."); see also 2 JAMES FITZIAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW OF ENGLAND 82 (London, MacMillan 1883) ("The forms in which deliberate anger and 
righteous disapprobation are expressed, and the execution of criminal justice is the most 
emphatic of such forms, stand to the one set of passions in the same relation in which mar­
riage stands to the other."). 
7. Stuntz argues that there is more to the story of overcriminalization than merely the 
widespread belief that we should "get tough on crime." Overcriminalization is a pathological 
overreaction to this belief by legislators. Stuntz, supra note 1, at 529-33. This overreaction 
comes in two forms. One is the aim of increasing conviction rates as much as possible. The 
pathology of this aim is the subject of the next Part of this Essay. I deal here with the second 
pathological aim identified by Stuntz, which is to take "symbolic" steps against crime. I take 
this to refer to the mollifying condemnation of wrongdoing. For example, Stuntz notes that 
carjacking statutes are redundant and rarely invoked, but they reflect the public's disap­
proval of carjacking and symbolize the legislature's concern about it. Id. at 531 & n.1 08. 
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hensive, the public expects the criminal law to be comprehensive. 
Because moral condemnation is subtly responsive to variations in con­
duct and context, the public expects the criminal law to be subtly re­
sponsive in the same way - even though the informality that allows 
moral condemnation to be subtly responsive is necessarily absent from 
a legal system. The broad and deep criminal law that Stuntz describes 
may be the product of an expectation on the part of the public that the 
criminal law will be broad and deep in these ways. But if this is what 
lies behind overcriminalization and the accretion of power to prosecu­
tors, then the trends toward overcriminalization are essentially benign. 
The public's expectation that the criminal law will provide a moral 
condemnation of wrongdoing is no more pathological than the con­
flicting constituents of the rule of law ideal, because it is a legitimate 
expectation. 
This benign diagnosis can be supported by the same kind of his­
torical analysis that Stuntz uses to support his thesis.8 Stuntz is pessi­
mistic about the power of criminal law scholars to counter the trend 
toward overcriminalization, and one of the reasons for his pessimism is 
the failure of most states to adopt the central innovation of the Model 
Penal Code: the culpability, or fault,9 provisions of section 2.02.10 But 
there is more to this story than Stuntz suggests. 
The culpability provisions of the Code did not merely simplify and 
consolidate traditional mens rea categories. They also eschewed the 
kind of frank normative assessments featured in traditional criminal 
fault concepts such as "implied malice" and "depraved heart." This 
choice by the Code drafters was the product of the dominant strains in 
legal scholarship at mid-point in the twentieth century - consequen­
tialism, legal positivism, and political liberalism - which combined to 
cast the criminal law as a means of social control operating independ­
ently of ordinary morality.11 These currents did not lead the Code 
8. One criticism of Stuntz's article that I do not pursue here is that his basic mode of 
analysis is public choice theorizing: he analyzes the costs and incentives of institutional ac­
tors under various legal regimes. I find the stories plausible and the analysis persuasive, but 
Stuntz's hypotheses (like the hypothesis I advance in the text) often cry out for testing. The 
omission of actual testing is characteristic of public choice theory, see DONALD P. GREEN & 
IAN SHAPIRO, THE PATHOLOGIES OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF 
APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 47-71 (1994), but that makes it no less problematic. 
9. The word "culpability" is ambiguous between fault in wrongdoing and eligibility (in 
the sense of fair candidacy) of a defendant for punishment. Eligibility is the concern in doc­
trines of excuse, such as insanity. Fault is an aspect of wrongdoing that is best (but not neces­
sarily) described in terms of intentional states. See Kyron Huigens, Rethinking the Penalty 
Phase, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1195, 123 0-54 (2000) (developing this distinction). The subject of 
§ 2. 02's hierarchy of intentional states is fault, not eligibility. 
1 0. Stuntz, supra note 1, at 583-84 & n.276. 
11. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 28, 46 (1968) [hereinafter HART, 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY] ("If with this in mind we turn back to criminal law and 
its excusing conditions, we can regard their function as a mechanism for similarly maximizing 
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drafters to reject a fault requirement altogether in favor of general 
strict liability - as H.L.A. Hart, for example, would have done12 -
but these philosophical and political commitments did lead the Code 
drafters to cabin the inquiry into fault as much as possible. The 
primary device the drafters used to limit the fault inquiry was a set 
of well-defined intentional states - purpose, knowledge, and 
recklessness - exhibited by the defendant on the occasion of his 
wrongdoing.13 This intentional-states or subjective approach to fault 
permitted the Code to represent the normative question of fault as a 
descriptive inquiry.14 The Code recognized a category of negligence as 
well, and with it a more frank normative inquiry into the reasonable­
ness of the defendant's conduct.15 But punishing negligent conduct 
is specifically disfavored in the Code.16 The default level of fault 
under the Code is recklessness17 - an intentional state consisting of 
the conscious disregard of a known risk.18 
The intentional-states construction of fault accorded well with the 
philosophical commitments of the Code's drafters, but it fared poorly 
in the court of common sense. As Stuntz notes, most states have not 
adopted recklessness as the default level of fault.19 The reason for this 
repudiation of the Code's central provision is its failure to deal with 
unreasonable mistakes. Under the Code approach, any genuine mis­
take on the part of the defendant disproves the existence of the requi­
site intentional state, negates fault, and requires acquittal even if the 
mistake is unreasonable.20 This is a hard implication to swallow when 
it acquits someone such as the drunken, immature, morally obtuse 
rapist who genuinely believes that a woman's "No" means "Yes," and 
within the framework of coercive criminal law the efficacy of the individual's informed and 
considered choice in determining the future and also his power to predict that future."). 
12. HART, Punishment and the Elimination of Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 11, at 158, 176-77. 
13. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1985). 
14. See Alan C. Michaels, "Rationales" of Criminal Law Then and Now: For a Judg­
mental Descriptivism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 54, 62-81 (2000) (describing the Model Penal 
Code drafters' preference for descriptive standards, especially in homicide law). 
15. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d). 
16. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. 4 ("[Negligence] should properly not generally be 
deemed sufficient in the definition of specific crimes . . . .  "). 
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3). 
18. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c). 
19. See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 583 n.276 (citing Dannye Holley, The Influence of the 
Model Penal Code's Culpability Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportu­
nities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 229, 243 & n.40 
(1997)). 
2 0. See MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2. 04 cmt. 1 (1985) ("There is no 
justification, however, for requiring ignorance or mistake be reasonable if the crime or the 
element of the crime involved requires acting purposely or knowingly for its commission."). 
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who is as a result only negligent, not reckless, as to the element of 
nonconsent in rape.21 Similarly, the Code's intentional-states approach 
to fault implies that genuine belief about the necessity for self-defense 
will justify the use of force, including deadly force. There is no re­
quirement that the belief be reasonable. If; then;· a paranoid, racist, 
trigger-happy social misfit genuinely believes that he is about to be 
robbed by some black youths on a subway, he may shoot them, re­
gardless of the unreasonableness of his belief. This too proved to be 
unpalatable to legislatures and courts.22 For both kinds of mistake, 
most jurisdictions prescribe a reasonableness inquiry - the functional 
equivalent of negligence - as the requisite level of fault.23 
Cases of unreasonable mistake are rare, so it would be hard to at­
tribute the problem of overcriminalization to the. Code's inept treat­
ment of such cases. But the Code's intentional-states approach to fault 
and its pretense to non-normative descriptions of fault are likely cul­
prits in overcriminalization. As I have argued above, one motive 
behind drafting highly specific criminal statutes is the desire to make 
the criminal law sensitive to the specific contexts in which wrongdoing 
takes place, just as our ordinary moral assessments tend to be highly 
context-sensitive. The doctrines that the Model Penal Code rejected 
- nonintentional or objective fault doctrines such as "implied malice" 
and "depraved heart" in homicide - served precisely this role in the 
criminal law. Nonintentional fault doctrines call for a broad assess­
ment of the manner and circumstances in which wrongdoing is done. 
They contextualize the jury's inquiry into the defendant's wrongdoing 
21. See Regina v. Morgan, [1976] A.C. 182, 2 03-04 (Lord Cross); id. at 214-15 (Lord 
Hailsham); id. at 237-39 (Lord Fraser) (affirming rape convictions of British military 
personnel while finding error in the trial court's refusal to instruct that a genuine mistake 
about nonconsent should lead the jury to acquit) (citing Criminal Appeal Act, 1968, Ch. 19 
§ 2(1) (Eng.) (authorizing the affirmance of convictions in spite of error when not inconsis-
tent with justice)). 
, 
22. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the New York legisla­
ture departed from the Model Penal Code's provision on the exculpating effect of a genuine 
belief in justifying conditions by inserting the word "reasonable"): The facts in Goetz were 
less egregious than those in the text, but the fear that such a case could arise in the future 
and occasion acquittals based on unreasonable and idiosyncratic fears was plainly on the 
court's mind. 
23. See Harriet R. Galvin, Shielding Rape Victims in the State and Federal Courts: A 
Proposal for the Second Decade, 7 0  MINN. L. REV. 763, 849 (1986) ("[A] majority of courts 
here have adopted the rule that only a reasonable mistake is a valid defense [to rape]."); see 
also, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE§ 197 (20 02) {homicide is justifiable "when there is reasonable 
ground to apprehend a design to commit a felony or to do some great bodily injury"); N.Y. 
PENAL LAW§ 35.15 (2002) (authorizing a person to use physical force "when and to the ex­
tent he reasonably believes such to be necessary to defend himself or a third person from 
what he reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such 
other person"). In a variety of provisions, the Code itself balks at the implications of the 
intentional-states construction of fault. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.08(2) (barring the 
use of voluntary intoxication to negate the intentional state of recklessness). 
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and facilitate a fine-grained moral assessment.24 To the extent the 
Model Penal Code succeeded in its reformative aims - and in this re­
spect its influence extends beyond explicit adoptions of its central 
principle of culpability (§ 2.02) - criminal codes around the country 
were deprived of this resource.25 In the absence of the jury-based tai­
loring permitted by nonintentional fault doctrines, legislators have 
provided for prosecutor-based tailoring in the form of nuanced, over­
lapping offense definitions. In short, the abolition of nonintentional 
fault doctrines under the influence of the Model Penal Code may have 
had the effect of displacing discretion in the system from juries to 
prosecutors, as legislators sought context-sensitivity through specific 
criminal statutes instead of general criminal statutes premised on 
nonintentional fault doctrines; 
The notion that neither prosecutors nor juries should have such 
discretion is a tempting one, because both approaches seem to detract 
from the rule of law. But if they do, this is not a matter of pathology. 
The existence of discretion, somewhere in the system, to make a 
context-sensitive evaluation of the offender's conduct and character is 
intrinsic to criminal law because context-specific, retrospective 
assessments of the offender and his wrongdoing are intrinsic to just 
punishment.26 This, at any rate, seems to be our standing judgment. 
The trend at mid-point in the twentieth century toward treating crimi­
nal law as an instrument of social control, divorced from the aims of 
ordinary morality, was widely repudiated in the 1970s and 1980s.27 For 
example, the adoption of determinate sentencing systems by Congress 
and a number of state legislatures in the 1980s was preceded by a great 
deal of academic commentary about "just deserts,"28 and by a noisy 
repudiation of the indeterminate sentencing systems that were an es­
sential part of the Model Penal Code's consequentialist punishment 
24. See Huigens, Dead End, supra note 5, at 966-71, 1028-31 (analyzing nonintentional 
fault in this way). 
25. Even those jurisdictions that have not adopted the Model Penal Code have nar­
rowed the range of fault categories and have preferred intentional states as the basis for 
fault. See Holley, supra note 19, at 238 & n.23, 241 & n.32, 245-46 & n.50. In this regard, the 
Model Penal Code is as much effect as cause. Its intentional states approach to fault was the 
product of a broad Anglo-American consensus that criminal liability should be confined, as 
much as possible, to intentional wrongdoing. See, e.g., GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL 
LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 43 (2d ed. 1961); Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be 
Excluded from Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 635-44 (1963). 
26. Huigens, Dea</ End, supra note 5, at 971-80; Kyron Huigens, Virtue and lnculpation, 
108 HARV. L. REV. 1423, 1458-67 (1995). 
27. See FRANCIS ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981) (ana­
lyzing the early stages of this trend). 
28. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 45-50 (1974); 
RICHARD SINGER, JUST DESERTS (1979); ERNST VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS 
(1975); ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE 49-55 (1976). 
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theory.29 The rhetoric of the determinate sentencing movement was 
retributive, and this rhetoric is strong evidence of standing judgments 
about the role of moral assessments in punishment and the requisite 
discretion to make them. (This is true of the rhetoric even if, as I argue 
below, the substance of the reforms was a crude act consequentialism 
that incapacitates undesirables regardless of desert.) It is evidence that 
the scholar-reformers of the Model Penal Code failed to dissuade the 
public from its expectation that the criminal law will provide moral 
condemnation of wrongdoing. This persistence is itself evidence of 
that expectation's legitimacy. If overcriminalization is the product of 
that expectation, then overcriminalization is not pathological - even 
if it is unwise or unjust. 
Ill. THE PATHOGEN, IF THERE IS ONE 
Stuntz's analysis of the interlocking incentives of criminal justice 
policy makers is impressive, but the incentives that lead to overcrimi­
nalization reduce ultimately to one piece of logic: if conviction is eas­
ier, then more people will be convicted and imprisoned. Stuntz never 
asks why this should be anyone's objective. We can choose to convict 
and imprison people for a number of reasons. One possibility is that 
they deserve punishment. But if this is the rationale for punishment, 
then the logic of more and easier convictions makes no sense. The 
careful assessment of wrongdoing and desert would proceed in indi­
vidual cases, in complete disregard of gross conviction rates. A more 
likely explanation for overcriminalization is that we are attempting to 
prevent crime in the future by incapacitating the maximum number of 
people with criminal propensities for as long as possible. If this is the 
objective of overcriminalization, then it is part of the quarantine 
movement that has given us three strikes laws, mandatory minimum 
sentences, rigid determinate sentencing systems, sexual offender 
commitment statutes, and expanded death sentencing. 
Consider, for example, a recent defense of California's three 
strikes law by one of its drafters, California Secretary of State Bill 
Jones. He writes: "By carefully targeting the small percentage of 
criminals most likely to commit the majority of California's crimes, 
Three Strikes has had a maximum impact on the crime rate by keeping 
the worst of repeat offenders incarcerated."30 Later in the same article, 
one hears overtones of the deep and broad overcriminalization that 
29. See KATE STITH & JOSE A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 24-35 (1998) (describing the Code's consequentialist 
sentencing philosophy and its widespread rejection in the 1970s as a prelude to federal sen­
tencing reform). 
30. Bill Jones, Why the Three Strikes Law is Working in California, 11 STAN. L. & 
POL'Y. REV. 23, 24 (1999). 
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Stuntz decries: "The simple goal of Three Strikes is public safety. It is 
far better, for example, to remove a child molester from the streets for 
the commission of a so-called lower level felony than to wait for the 
offender to abuse another victim."31 The theory of punishment implicit 
in these arguments is a crude act consequentialism: the aim is to pro­
mote social welfare by incapacitating those most likely to reduce it. If 
overcriminalization is pathological, then this primitive theory of pun­
ishment is the pathogen. 
This quarantine movement is often described as a triumph of re­
tributivism in punishment.32 But nothing could be further from the 
truth.33 Retribution as an end of punishment is emphasized in 
deontological and aretaic theories of punishment.34 Retribution has no 
effective role in a consequentialist theory of punishment, and, as the 
foregoing paragraph indicates, the logic of quarantine is thoroughly 
consequentialist. On the level of theory, the shift from the rehabilita­
tive, indeterminate sentencing philosophy exemplified in the Model 
Penal Code to the incapacitative, determinate sentencing philosophy 
exemplified in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is a shift from a so­
phisticated, humane consequentialism to a crude, morally obtuse con­
sequentialism. In its extreme forms, the consequentialist theory of 
punishment denied the relevance of fault and desert to criminal justice 
policy, seeking to reduce crime and promote social welfare by treating 
criminogenic psychological and social pathologies.35 The reformers 
who gave us the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and its cohort of sen-
31. Id. at 25. 
32. See, e.g., Paul G. Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante's Inferno and the So­
cial Construction of Crime, 26 LAW & Soc;. INQUIRY 787, 789 (2CXH); Stephen P. Garvey, 
Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1801, 1839 (1999); Joseph L. Hoffmann, 
Apprendi v. New Jersey: Back to the Future?, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 255, 266-67 {2001); 
Robert L. Misner, A Strategy for Mercy, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303, 1303-04 (2000). 
33. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 29, at 51-55; Andrew von Hirsch, Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines: Do They Provide Principled Guidance?, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 367, 
371 (1989) ("The Commission's conclusion can be summarized thus: since people disagree 
over the aims of sentencing, it is best to have no rationale at all."). 
34. The term "retributive theory of punishment" is misleading because retribution is a 
function of punishment, not a theory of punishment. Given that the moral justification of 
punishment is the principal, though not the only, issue in the theory of punishment, it makes 
sense to categorize theories of punishment according to the three main categories of moral 
theory: consequentialist, deontological, and aretaic. "Aretaic" refers to virtue ethics, which 
originated with Aristotle and is the subject of a robust modem literature, much of which is 
extremely useful in thinking through the problems of the criminal law. See, e.g., Kyron 
Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 GEO. L.J. 387, 434-49 (2002) [hereinafter Huigens, 
Solving Apprendi] (analyzing the constitutional validity of determinate sentencing, manda­
tory minimum sentencing, and three-strikes sentencing in aretaic terms). 
35. See ALLEN, supra note 27, at 5-7; R.A. Duff & David Garland, Introduction: Think­
ing About Punishment, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT l, 8-10 (R.A. Duff & David Garland 
eds., 1994); see also, e.g., BARBARA WOOTEN, CRIME ANO CRIMINAL LAW 52-53, 75-79 
(1%3) (describing the purpose of criminal law as crime prevention and denying the rele­
vance of mens rea to that task). 
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tencing practices used retributive rhetoric to repudiate rehabilitation 
as an end of punishment, but they did not in fact adopt or advance a 
retributive theory of punishment. For example, the goal of setting sen­
tences according to desert was explicitly disavowed by the Guidelines' 
principal drafter, Stephen Breyer, as unworkably "subjective."36 He 
adopted instead a revealed preference approach to sentencing, under 
which the presumptive sentences of the Guidelines were based, osten­
sibly, on the actual practices of sentencing judges. In fact, these sen­
tencing preferences were systematically overstated.37 The result has 
been unduly harsh sentences imposed under a system that is both too 
narrow and too rigid to tailor sentences to desert. As in the case of 
three strikes laws, the aim is not a principled proportionality premised 
on desert, but the promotion of social welfare by means of the quaran­
tine of social undesirables. 
Ultimately, however, the quarantine movement's implicit theory of 
punishment is pathological, not because it is crude, but because it is 
consequentialist. Consequentialism is a deeply flawed moral theory, 
and the pervasive, if largely unconscious and inarticulate, consequen­
tialism of twentieth-century American legal theory and practice has 
been the source of enormous confusion and damage.38 An important 
clue to the pathological nature of this theory is Breyer's use of the 
word "subjective" as an explanation for his rejection of desert as a 
basis for the Guidelines' sentencing ranges. Breyer's consequentialism 
in the theory of punishment seems to be motivated, as it apparently is 
for many consequentialists, by the belief that value judgments are 
noncognitive; that they are the product of feeling as opposed to reason 
(and in that sense "subjective," because the individual has exclusive 
access to his feelings).39 If value is divorced from reason, then one 
must suppose that all human ends are just subliminal givens, and that 
36. See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises 
upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1988) (citing the "inherent subjectiv­
ity" of judgments about just deserts as the reason the Guidelines do not pursue a principled 
retributivism). 
37. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative 
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223 (1993); von 
Hirsch, supra note 33, at 373. 
38. To give an example from far afield that conveys the scope of the problem I have in 
mind, one can argue that a simplistic ethics of maximization produced both the economics 
behind the deregulation of financial markets in the 1980s and 1990s and also the evisceration 
of professional ethics in the accounting and legal professions, both of which led, in tum, to 
the accounting scandals, bear market, and recession of 2002. See George Soros, Busted: Why 
the Markets Can't Fix Themselves, NEW REPUBl:.IC, Sept. 2, 2002, at 18, 21. 
39. See Stephen Breyer, Justice Breyer: Federal Sentencing Guidelines Revisited, CRIM. 
JUST., Spring 1999, at 28, 30 (1999) ("But [a 'just deserts'] approach foundered on the shoal 
of philosophical differences, for those differences threatened unacceptable subjectivity."). 
But see Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 270 (2002) 
("The relevant values, by limiting interpretive possibilities and guiding interpretation, them­
selves constrain subjectivity . . . .  "). 
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rational analysis of right conduct is limited to the means by which 
these given ends can be maximized.40 This is the same moral theory 
and theory of action behind the Model Penal Code's approach to fault. 
On these assumptions about rationality and right conduct, it makes 
sense to minimize the role of value judgments by reframing the nor­
mative demands of the law in descriptive terms, because those norma­
tive demands are arbitrary to the extent that they reflect the subjec­
tive, ultimately irrational value judgments of jurors and judges. This 
move is ubiquitous in twentieth-century legal thought. From the legal 
positivist school to the law and economics movement, the ingenuity of 
twentieth-century legal scholars in their attempts to eradicate "subjec­
tive value judgments" from the law was remarkable. Ultimately, 
however, it was a fool's errand. Law is irreducibly a normative system, 
normative choices entail value judgments,41 and value judgments are 
not beyond the reach of reason.42 To cabin normativity and value in 
40. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 39-40 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651) ("But 
whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which he for his part 
calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evil/ .... "). Gary Becker 
acknowledges the roots of economics in this hedonic conception of value. See GARY 
BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 8 (1976) (describing the basis 
of economic theory in "the pleasure-pain calculus"); see also Martin Hollis & Robert 
Sugden, Rationality in Action, 102 MIND 1, 2-3 (1993) (describing Hobbes's conception of 
value as among the origins of rational choice theory). 
41. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 19 ( 1959) ("The courts have both the title and the duty when a case is properly 
before them to review the actions of the other branches in light of constitutional provisions, 
even though the action involves value choices, as invariably action does."). 
42. There is a broad, neo-Humean consensus in Anglo-American philosophy that moti­
vations have a significant affective or emotional component, and that Kantian cognitivism -
the notion that belief alone can motivate action - is untenable. Garrett Cullity & Berys 
Gaut, Introduction, in ETHICS AND PRACTICAL REASON 1-27 (Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut 
eds., 1997) (describing a broad consensus over intemalism regarding reasons for action and a 
desiderative account of internalism); cf NANCY SHERMAN, MAKING A NECESSITY OF 
VIRTUE: ARISTOTLE AND KANT ON VIRTUE 125-26 (1997) (describing Kant's view of the 
relationship between motivation and the emotions). The "pseudo-Humean" view that de­
fined the questionable goals of much twentieth-century legal thought is the notion that 
valuation and motivation are noncognitive in a stronger sense, premised on a hard distinc­
tion between reason and emotion. See supra note 5. But while it is true that emotions can 
distort rational thinking, it is also demonstrably true that rational thought is impossible 
without the capacity for emotion. ANTONIO R. DAMASJO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, 
REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 52-79 (1994). Emotions have truth value; that is, one can 
be mistaken in one's emotions. GERALD GAUS, VALUE AND JUSTIFICATION: THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL THEORY 136 (1990). For example, emotions can be changed 
through a process involving their articulation and rational criticism. See id. at 31-34 (noting 
that psychotherapy assumes that emotions are cognitive); Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of 
Value in Legal Thought, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1520, 1546 (1992) (book review) (same). Just as 
emotions are subject to rational evaluation, so are the valuations and motivations that are 
premised in emotion. GAUS, supra, at 106-26; JUSTIN OAKLEY, MORALITY AND THE 
EMOTIONS 34-37 (1992); ANDREW 0RTONY ET AL., THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF 
EMOTIONS 34-47 (1988); Andrew Ortony, Value and Emotion, in MEMORIES, THOUGHTS, 
AND EMOTIONS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF GEORGE MANDLER 337 (William Knessen et al. 
eds., 1991); cf RONALD DESOUSA, THE RATIONALITY OF EMOTION 218-20 (1987) (de­
scribing mistakes in desire as arising from mistakes about the aspect or character of the emo-
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the manner demanded by consequentialist legal theory is unnecessary, 
impossible, and unwise. 
The particular pathology of the consequentialist theory of punish­
ment is its demonstrated tendency to devolution. Consequentialist 
punishment theorists have defended their views against charges that 
welfare maximization authorizes scapegoating43 and quarantine,44 and 
that a consistent consequentialist system of social control could hardly 
be called punishment at all because it has no use for such traditional 
features of punishment as wrongdoing, fault, and desert.45 The princi­
pal response to such objections was developed by, among others, John 
Rawls46 and H.L.A. Hart.47 The argument is a variation on rule conse­
quentialism: it asserts that consequentialism does not authorize scape­
goating or quarantine because the moral justification of punishment 
does not proceed on a case by case basis. Punishment systems as a 
whole are morally justified on consequentialist grounds, but the justi­
fication of punishment in individual cases is only a legal justification 
within the terms of the punishment system. For the sake of public ac­
ceptance and intuitive appeal - and in order to forestall scapegoating 
and quarantine - the legal system might be outfitted with the tradi-
tion). Desires have propositional content, whereas mere feelings do not. MICHAEL SMITH, 
THE MORAL PROBLEM 104-111 (1994) (pointing out that, whereas we say that "I feel a 
desire to" we never say "I feel a pain to"). We also are fallible regarding our desires, as we 
are not regarding our feelings. Id. Even a valuation that ordinarily is deemed a matter of 
pure taste, such as a liking for a particular food, is not beyond the reach of reason. See John 
Willoughby, A Chemical Mystery That Excites the Taste Buds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1998, at 
F3 (reporting on Asian cultures' recognition of umami as a distinct taste in addition to bitter, 
sour, sweet, and salty). 
43. See, e.g., J.D. Mabbott, Punishment, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: 
A COLLECTION OF PAPERS 39, 41 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) (1939) ("Suppose it were discov­
ered that a particular criminal had lived a much better life after his release and that many 
would-be criminals believing him to have been guilty were influenced by his fate, but yet that 
the 'criminal' was punished for something he had never done, would these excellent results 
prove the punishment just?"). 
44. See HART, Postscript: Responsibility and Retribution, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note II, at 210, 232-33 [hereinafter HART, Postscript] (describing 
"the extreme point" of consequentialist punishment theory as not requiring a crime or con­
viction). 
45. Mabbott's response to the scapegoating argument, like Hart's, turned on the distinc­
tion, discussed in the text, between a practice on one hand and instances of the practice on 
the other. It is perhaps a measure of the dominance of consequentialism in their day that 
both Mabbott and Hart thought that the partial accommodation of retributive concerns in 
the consequentialist justification of punishment made his theory a "retributive" one. See 
HART, Postscript, supra note 44, at 233; Mabbott, supra note 43, at 39; see also Antony Flew, 
The Justification of Punishment, reprinted in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT: A 
COLLECTION OF PAPERS 83, 92 (H.B. Acton ed., 1969) (1954) ("[I]n so far as Mabbott's 
view can be called retributive it is not a justification (satisfactory or otherwise); and in so far 
as any sort of justification is offered it is that of an ideal (not hedonistic) utilitarian."). 
46. See John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3 (1955). 
47. See HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND 
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 11, at l, 5-11. 
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tional categories of wrongdoing, fault, and desert. Indeed, such fea­
tures arguably are required by the consequentialist theory of punish­
ment because they are welfare-maximizing: if the public does not see 
the traditional categories at work, the argument goes, the criminal jus­
tice system will lose credibility and, as a result, efficacy as a system of 
punishment.48 
The difficulty with this argument is that it is no defense of punish­
ment at all. By this reasoning, if the public were to lose its preference 
for punishing only upon proof of wrongdoing, fault, and desert, then 
those things would no longer be required features of just punishment. 
Should the public develop a preference for a system of quarantine in­
stead of a system of punishment, the consequentialist theory of pun­
ishment would sanction the adoption of quarantine. Obviously, this is 
no longer a mere debating point. We are well on our way to replacing 
punishment with quarantine. Wittingly or not, legal scholars of a con­
sequentialist bent have done their part in bringing about this 
devolution. 
Admittedly, causation and responsibility are hard to assign in the 
case of such an enormous social change. But the consequentialist 
theory of punishment - and, again, by this I mean the working 
theory, the basic assumptions of lawyers, judges, and legislators, as 
well as scholars - undoubtedly has played a large role and bears 
much of the responsibility. One sees this not only in Breyer's 
disavowal of desert as too "subjective," but also in the ineffectual 
responses to such choices by defenders of traditional criminal law 
values. In their otherwise cogent and devastating critique of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Stith and Cabranes argue that deter­
minate sentencing robs the end of a criminal trial of its gravitas. The 
simple application of a sentencing grid lacks the tension, the mystery, 
and the profound theater of discretionary sentencing.49 They argue for 
the necessity of "highly subjective judgments"50 and the use of intui­
tion51 in sentencing. But this is hardly persuasive. The consequentialist 
can reply that intuitions and subjective judgments are incompatible 
with legality because they are arbitrary, and he can dismiss the theater 
of sentencing as inessential and inefficient aesthetics. Stith and 
Cabranes do not concede the premise that sentencing judgments are 
"subjective" in the sense that Breyer supposes they are,52 but they say 
48. This part of the argument has been further developed by Paul Robinson and John 
Darley. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 6, passim. 
49. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 29, at 81-82. 
50. Id. at 150. 
51. Id. at 169. 
52. Id. at 82 ("This does not mean that judgment, as we understand it, is a matter of 
subjective 'feeling.' "). 
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too little about alternative conceptions of value, motivation, judgment, 
and just punishment to be able to escape the gravitational pull of con­
sequentialist legal theory.53 Whatever might be the precise causal role 
of consequentialism in the devolution of punishment to quarantine, it 
has, at a minimum, left great scholars of good will without the neces­
sary conceptual resources to defend genuine punishment. 
Stuntz's greatest hope for the cure of overcriminalization - the 
constitutionalization of substantive criminal law - is precluded by the 
same set of mistaken philosophical commitments that caused the 
problem he critiques.54 The constitutionalization of substantive crimi­
nal law requires the Supreme Court to make contested value judg­
ments, which the current Court is extremely reluctant to do. The 
Court's view, and the prevailing view among constitutional scholars, is 
that the political branches should make such judgments.55 One of the 
principal reasons behind this deference to other branches is the belief 
that value judgments are noncognitive, and that the only rational way 
to analyze them is in terms of completed choices in a marketplace of 
ideas.56 The result is a constitutional jurisprudence of revealed prefer­
ences. For example, the Court's seemingly robust standard for Eighth 
Amendment analysis - whether the practice in question is consistent 
with "evolving standards of decency"57 - is in reality little more than 
counting heads to see if the state legislatures have forged a consensus 
on the constitutional question at hand.58 Actually to deliberate on 
questions of value and to define the ends of a great nation is a role 
that the present Court simply refuses to perform, in part because some 
of its members doubt the very possibility of such deliberations. The 
53. See Huigens, Solving Apprendi, supra note 34, at 434-42 (offering an alternative di­
agnosis of the Guidelines' shortcomings). 
54. See Stuntz, supra note 1, at 587-96. 
55. See, e.g., Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 
96 MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1301-02 (1998). 
. 
56. Justice Scalia has explicitly drawn the connection between judicial deference and a 
noncognitive conception of valuation on a number of occasions, most recently in his dissent 
from the Court's imposing a per se Eighth Amendment ban on executing the mentally re­
tarded. He wrote: " [t)he unexpressed reason for this unexpressed 'contemplation' of the 
Constitution is presumably that really good lawyers have moral sentiments superior to those 
of the common herd, whether in I 791 or today . . .. '[I]n the end,' it is the feelings and intui-
tion of a majority of the Justices that count . . . .  " Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2265 
(2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (opin­
ion of Scalia, J.); cf. Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term - Foreword: The 
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 80 (1992) (attributing Scalia's pref­
erence for rules over standards to "an effort to avoid judgments of value" and to a hard 
fact/value distinction that is characteristic of legal positivism). 
57. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1957). 
58. See, e.g., Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2248-49 (citing increasingly common legislative bans on 
execution of the mentally retarded as the principal reason for its decision to recognize such a 
ban under the Eighth Amendment). But see Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2247 (saying that the 
Court's judgment is "brought to bear on" the objective evidence of legislative action). 
826 Michigan Law Review (Vol. 101:811 
same pathogen that has devolved punishment into quarantine · will 
probably preclude the constitutional revival of genuine punishment, at 
least in the near future. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
If constitutionalization of substantive criminal law is a solution to 
the problem of overcriminalization, then a necessary step - not to say 
a complete solution - is to jettison the jurisprudence of revealed 
preferences and the philosophical commitments to noncognitivism and 
consequentialism that lie behind it. 
Stuntz's view of this task is hard to figure out. On one hand, his 
general method owes much to public choice analysis, which suggests a 
commitment to consequentialism. He also seems to subscribe to the 
jurisprudence of revealed preferences. In a critical footnote, he writes: 
"If criminal law is inescapably political, both in the sense that it rests 
on contestable value judgments and in the sense that it embodies 
trade-offs between different values, it seems natural to assign respon­
sibility for it to the most politically accountable actors.59" On the other 
hand, Stuntz recognizes the possibility of rational value judgments and 
genuine deliberations on public ends. Notice that he refers to 
"contestable" and not merely "contested" value judgments. And he 
goes on to say: 
My response to that argument is not to deny its premise. Rather, I seek 
to show that legislators' political incentives are to criminalize too much 
- with "too much" defined by the preferences of the very constituents 
whose wishes legislators are supposed to represent. Once one under­
stands these incentives, one may conclude that courts are more likely 
than legislatures to capture social value judgments accurately.6tl 
But to make this argument, Stuntz has to deny the premise that value 
judgments should be left to legislatures because they are contestable. 
Stuntz's argument is that whatever level of criminalization voters pre­
fer, legislators rationally and systematically produce more than that 
amount. But if courts are to deal with this oversupply through the con­
stitutionalization of criminal law, they will have to be persuaded to do 
so in particular cases, for particular reasons, with particular results -
and in doing so these courts will not be "captur[ing] social value judg­
ments accurately." Instead, they will be making value judgments of 
their own. 
Not only is there nothing wrong with courts making value judg­
ments, it is unavoidable. Legal decisionmaking in any forum is irre­
ducibly normative, and normative decisionmaking entails value judg-
59. Stuntz, supra note 1, at 527 n.96. 
60. Id. 
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ments. The Court's making overt value judgments seems problematic 
only because false conceptions of value and normativity have been 
used to suggest that there is some alternative. To get rid of those 
assumptions would make it easier for the Court to constitutionalize 
substantive criminal law. This would tend to work against overcrimi­
nalization and the other features of the quarantine movement not only 
for the reasons that Stuntz gives, but also because it would block the 
principal pathogen in the criminal law: the consequentialist theory of 
punishment. 
